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Abstract
We compare investments in generating capacities of an integrated
monopolist with the aggregate investments of two vertically integrated
competing firms. The firms invest in their capacity and fix the retail
price while electricity demand is uncertain. The wholesale price is
determined in a unit price auction where the firms know the level of
demand when they bid their capacities. Total capacities can be larger
or smaller with a duopoly than with a monopoly. If the two firms
select the Pareto dominant equilibrium, then the retail price is always
higher and the social welfare lower in the duopoly case.
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1 Introduction
In many industrialised countries the market for electricity has been liber-
alised. Whereas the introduction of competition was rather successful in, for
example, the Scandinavian Countries and in England and Wales, others, like
California and New Zealand, experienced major crises with an explosion of
wholesale prices and black-outs.1 The focus of this paper is, however, not to
figure out what went wrong when California and New Zealand opened their
markets for competition,2 but rather to investigate, whether the incentives to
invest in generating capacity can be suboptimal under competition compared
to a monopoly market.
Why should this be the case? The electricity market like many other markets
is characterised by an uncertain demand. Electricity can, however, not be
stored. All competing firms must use the same distribution network, and
the inflows and outflows of electricity into this network have to be balanced
at each point in time. If the balance cannot be preserved, then the network
collapses and none of the firms can sell electricity anymore. This creates
externalities that might be better internalised by a monopolist than by com-
peting firms.3 On the other hand, the monopolist tends to produce less
than is socially efficient and would therefore need and build fewer generating
capacities.
1See e.g. The Economist from March 7, 1998, p. 46, and from February 10, 2001, and
for New Zealand Modern Power Systems from August 2001, p. 11.
2For analyses of the Californian electricity crisis see, e.g., Joskow (2001), Borenstein
et al. (2002), Borenstein (2002), Wilson (2002) and Borenstein et al. (2006).
3Joskow and Tirole (2004a) also refer to these externalities during uncontrolled black-
outs.
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If we had perfect competition in the electricity market, electricity prices
should equal marginal costs. Under these circumstances von der Fehr and
Harbord (1997) as well as Castro-Rodriguez et al. (2001) show that, from a
social welfare point of view, firms build suboptimal low levels of generating
capacity. They also prove that firms invest more in their generating capacity,
if the spot market price exceeds marginal costs at a fixed margin. In addi-
tion von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) endogenise the spot market price of
electricity for an inelastic demand that is ex ante uncertain in the capacity
decision stage, and known, when the firms bid their capacity in the auction.4
They conclude that the firms under-invest in capacity as long as the distri-
bution of the uncertain inelastic demand is concave, meaning skewed to the
lower end of the distribution. But neither of the two compares the market
outcome under competition with the one generated by a monopoly.
Contrary to von der Fehr and Harbord (1997), we consider domestic con-
sumers with an ex ante elastic demand for electricity. They can, however,
not respond to price signals from the wholesale market. In the first stage two
firms invest in generating capacity. The firms are vertically integrated into
the retail sector. Then consumers sign a retail contract with one of the two
integrated firms in order to be delivered with electricity. The firms guarantee
their retail customers a certain retail price at which the consumers can buy
as much electricity as they want to, as long as there is no black-out.5 The
consumers choose the firm with the lowest retail price. Then nature chooses
4The auction is a unit price auction a` la von der Fehr and Harbord (1993).
5Contrary to Joskow and Tirole (2004a) we abstract from two-part tariffs for the sake of
simplicity and from state contingent rationing rules which the firms fix in advance together
with the retail price for their clients. The latter do not play a major role in the retail
competition for domestic consumers.
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the level of the demand shock. After observing demand, firms bid prices in
the wholesale market in order to get the right to supply their capacity to
the network. The wholesale market is modelled as a unit price auction a` la
von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993).6 Since the two firms commit to
retail prices before the auction takes place, demand is inelastic in the auction
as in von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) despite being ex ante elastic.
The fact that consumers cannot instantaneously respond to price signals is
due to the imperfect metering technology that is used by most residential cus-
tomers. This technology does not register how much electricity they consume
at a given point in time, and cannot communicate current market prices. In a
companion paper Boom (2002) I abstract from this problem and assume that
consumers can instantaneously respond to market prices and can therefore
directly participate in the spot market for electricity.7
Before the electricity markets were liberalized they were often characterized
by vertically integrated regional monopolies. These firms often survived the
liberalization process and are now competing in the electricity wholesale mar-
kets as well as in the retail market.8 How the vertical integration of firms
affects the competition on the wholesale and the retail market has hardly
6Green and Newbery (1992) based on Klemperer and Meyer (1989) suggested an alter-
native approach where firms bid differentiable supply functions instead of step function as
in von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993).
7Both papers were inspired by the proponents of a better metering technology who
argue that it reduces peak demands and improves the performance of liberalised elec-
tricity markets. See Borenstein (2002), Faruqui et al. (2001) as well as Borenstein and
Holland (2005). The latter show under which circumstances increasing the number of
price-responsive consumers improves social welfare in a perfectly competitive electricity
market. Their approach has been further extended by Joskow and Tirole (2004b).
8A high degree of vertical integration of electricity generating firms into the retail sector
can for example be observed in France, Spain and Germany. See e.g. Bergman et al. (1999)
and European Commission (2001).
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been analyzed up to now. The studies which analyse the effects of vertical
integration on the wholesale prices usually consider markets with regulated
or predetermined retail prices.9. Contrary to them, we also endogenize the
retail prices and explicitly focus on the interaction between the wholesale
and the retail market, when vertically integrated firms with market power
compete on the two related markets.
It turns out that the vertically integrated monopolist might install a smaller
or larger capacity than the two vertically integrated competitors together at
not too high capacity costs. If we focus, however, on subgame perfect Nash
equilibria that are not Pareto dominated, then the two duopoly firms invest
more than the monopolist. The social welfare is, nevertheless, always higher
under a monopoly than in the competitive setting, because the monopoly
price is always lower than the duopoly price.10
2 The Model
There are two firms j = A,B which generate electricity and are vertically
integrated into the retail sector. They face a mass of electricity consumers
that is normalised to one. Consumers suffer from demand shocks. They have
a quasi-linear utility function such that their surplus function is given by
V (x; ε, r) = U(x, ε)− rx = x− ε− (x− ε)
2
2
− rx, (1)
9See e.g. Ku¨hn and Machado (2004), Bushnell et al. (2005), Mansur (2007) and Bal-
dursson and von der Fehr (2007)
10These results contrast with those of the companion paper, Boom (2002), where the
monopoly nearly always invests less and the social welfare is always improved by compe-
tition.
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for a representative period where x is the consumed electricity, r is the retail
price paid per unit for electricity, and ε is the demand shock. It hits all
the consumers alike and is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1]. These
shocks should not be mistaken for the volatility of demand during a single
day which is somehow foreseeable. They refer to events like a hot summer in
California or a cold winter in the north of Europe. The demand for electricity
in the representative period can be derived from maximising V (x; ε, r) with
respect to x and results in
x(r, ε) = max{1 + ε− r, 0}. (2)
Note that the single consumer’s demand has no weight in the total demand.
Thus, he cannot influence the balance of supply and demand on the grid and
would therefore always accept the lowest retail price offered. If the offered
retail prices are identical, he signs each of the two retail contracts with equal
probability.
The two firms are risk neutral and maximize their (expected) profits. The
variable costs of generating electricity is assumed to be constant and, for the
sake of simplicity, equal to zero for both firms. Thus, the costs of firm j
consist only of the costs of capacity which are assumed to be:
C(kj) = zkj (3)
where z is a constant unit cost of capacity and kj the generation capacity
installed by firm j. Firms decide on their capacity kj and on their retail price
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offer rj before they know the level of demand in the representative period.
When they bid their capacity in the electricity wholesale market, the demand
shock is realised and the retail price is fixed. Therefore the market demand
is known for sure and does not respond to changes in the wholesale price.
The wholesale market price of electricity is determined in a unit price auction
of the type introduced by von der Fehr and Harbord (1997) and (1993). Such
an auction was at the heart of the Electricity Pool in England and Wales
before the reform in 2001, and still is in place in other liberalised markets
like, e.g., the Nord Pool in Scandinavia or the Spanish wholesale market.11
For the sake of simplicity firms have to bid a price pj at which they are willing
to supply their whole generating capacity.12 The auctioneer must secure the
balance of supply and demand on the grid if possible.13 Therefore he orders
the bids according to their prices and determines the marginal bid that is just
necessary to equal supply and demand. The price of the marginal bid is the
spot market price that is payed to all the generators for each unit of capacity
that is actually dispatched on the grid.14 The capacity of the supplier that has
bid below the marginal price is dispatched completely, whereas the marginal
supplier is only allowed to deliver that amount of electricity necessary to
balance supply and demand.15
11See Bergman et al. (1999).
12Thus, we do not consider the problem of strategic capacity withholding in order to
raise the auction price. See Crampes and Creti (2005) and Le Coq (2002) for such analyses.
13Transmission constraints are not considered here, although they might interact with
constraints in the generating capacity. See Wilson (2002) for insights into this problem
and for the analysis of isolated transmission constraints Borenstein et al. (2000), Joskow
and Tirole (2000) and Le´autier (2001)
14This differs the analysis here from simple Bertrand competition with capacity con-
straints as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where the undercutting firm receives only its
own price per unit sold even if its capacity is too low to serve all the customers.
15According to Wilson (2002) we assume an integrated system because participation in
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Since in our framework demand does not respond to changes in the whole-
sale price and since the total amount of installed capacities can also not be
influenced by the wholesale price, the auctioneer may also fail to find a price
that balances supply and demand in the market. Then a black-out occurs in
the representative period. In reality firms compete not only once in a repre-
sentative period but repeatedly on the wholesale and on the retail market.
We abstract from the repeated nature of both retail and wholesale markets
in order to simplify the analysis and to avoid running into issues of collu-
sion.16 Therefore a black-out in our representative period can be interpreted
as an inadequate supply of electricity in the system. We assume that no firm
can sell and deliver electricity, and all the firms realise zero profits. Thus, we
also abstract from any sort of rationing by the auctioneer or the generators of
electricity.17 This is done in order to maximize the punishment for the firms
if their aggregate capacity is too small, thus also maximizing the incentive
to install capacity.
If total capacities are sufficient to satisfy demand, the auctioneer accepts
only price offers that do not exceed the maximum price level p¯ that ensures
zero profits for the net-buyer in the auction. Alternatively, we could have
assumed that firms declare bankruptcy and neither supply electricity nor
demand it on behalf of their customers on the wholesale market if doing so
generates losses. This would establish the same maximum price. Consumers
the auction is compulsory if a generating firm wants to sell electricity.
16This has been analysed by Fabra (2003) and by Dechenaux and Kovenock (2005) for
the wholesale market.
17See Joskow and Tirole (2004a) for an analysis of a market where retailers propose not
only prices to consumers but also rationing rules which they want to apply. Although in
reality residential consumers are sometimes rationed, the rationing rules are usually not
spelled out in any sort of contract with their retailers.
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Figure 1: The Timing of the Game
would nevertheless extract electricity from the grid. This triggers most likely
a black-out due to the unavailable capacity of the bankrupt provider, and
even if not, the still available net-supplier will not receive any payments from
the bankrupt firm anymore.
The timing of the game is depicted in figure 1. The game proceeds as follows:
1. The two generating firms simultaneously choose their respective capac-
ity kj with j = A,B.
2. The firms simultaneously set their retail price rj. The consumers sub-
scribe to the firm with the lowest price or, subscribe to each firm with
probability one half, if both prices are identical.18
3. Nature determines the demand shock ε.
4. Both firms bid a price pj for their whole capacity kj in the wholesale
market.
5. The auctioneer determines the market clearing price p, if this is pos-
18Committing to a retail price is not unusual in reality. Green (2003) reports, for
example, that in Britain retail prices are typically set for a year.
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sible, and which generator is allowed to deliver which amount of elec-
tricity to the grid.
6. If supply and demand cannot be balanced, a black-out occurs. The
consumers are not served and do not pay anything to the generators.
If the balance on the wholesale market can be achieved, the consumers
are served and pay the retail price for each unit of their demand to
the firm to which they subscribed. The firms have to pay the wholesale
price for each unit of electricity that their retail customers required and
receive the wholesale price for each unit of electricity that they were
allowed to dispatch on the grid.
It is assumed that the two firms select a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium
if there are multiple Nash equilibria in one of the stages.
3 The Benchmark Cases
As benchmark case we analyse how much an integrated monopolist and a
social planner would invest in generating capacity, if he had to choose the
capacity and to fix the retail price r before the uncertainty of demand is
resolved.
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3.1 The Monopolist’s Capacity Choice
Note that with a monopolist a wholesale market does not exist. The monop-
olist’s profit function is given by:
pim(r, k) =

∫ 1
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk if r ≥ 2− k,∫ k−1+r
max{r−1,0} r(1 + ε− r)dε− zk if max{0, 1− k} ≤ r < 2− k,
−zk if r < max{0, 1− k}.
The first line in the equation corresponds to a high capacity k and/or a
high retail price r which ensure that the monopolist can serve any possible
demand. With intermediate levels of k and r black-outs cannot be prevented
for high demand shocks. For a low capacity k and/or a low retail price r a
black-out always occurs because the monopolist can never cover demand.
From the monopolist’s profit function the optimal retail price for a given
generating capacity can be calculated.
Lemma 1 For a given generating capacity k, the monopolist’s profit max-
imising retail price is r∗(k) = max{2− k, 3/4}.
Proof: See appendix A.
The monopolist sets always a price that ensures no electricity outages for all
possible demand shocks ε. For lower generating capacities (0 ≤ k < 5/4)
the retail price just avoids the black-out in the highest demand state and is
therefore decreasing in the generating capacity. As soon as the generating
capacity is large enough (k ≥ 5/4) to satisfy even the largest possible demand
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at the monopoly price for the expected demand, the monopolist chooses this
price and sticks to it.
The monopolist’s capacity choice is given in proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The monopolist chooses the generation capacity
k∗m =

5
4
− z
2
if z ≤ 1
2
0 if z > 1
2
.
The retail price in equilibrium is r∗m = 3/4 + z/2 as long as the investment
in generation capacity is positive, meaning z ≤ 1
2
.
Proof: See appendix A.
The monopolist’s investment decreases in the capacity cost z, but is dis-
continuous at z = 1
2
because even optimal capacity levels and an optimal
retail price would result in negative profits. The retail price increases in the
capacity cost z.
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3.2 The Social Planner’s Capacity Choice
The social planner maximizes the sum of the expected consumer’s and pro-
ducer’s surplus. The latter is given by
W (r, k) =

∫ 1
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε− zk if r ≥ 2− k∫ k−1+r
0
U(x(r, ε), ε)dε
+
∫ 1
k−1+r U(0, ε)− zk if 2− k > r ≥ max{1− k, 0}∫ 1
0
U(0, ε)− zk if 1− k > r ≥ 0
(4)
where U(·) corresponds to the consumers’ gross surplus function defined in
equation (1) and x(r, ε) to the consumers’ state dependant demand given
in equation (2). From the social welfare function the socially optimal retail
price for a given generating capacity can be calculated.
Lemma 2 For a given generating capacity k, the social welfare maximising
retail price is r∗∗(k) = max{2− k, 0}.
Proof: See appendix B.
The social planner always sets a price that ensures no electricity outages for
all possible demand shocks ε. For lower generating capacities (0 ≤ k < 2)
the retail price just avoids the black-out in the highest demand state and is
therefore decreasing in the generating capacity. As soon as the generating
capacity is large enough (k ≥ 2) to satisfy even the largest possible demand,
the social planner chooses a retail price which coincides with the marginal
production cost of 0.
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The social planner’s capacity choice is given in proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The social planner chooses the generation capacity
k∗∗s =

2− z if z ≤ 2−
√
5
3
0 if z > 2−
√
5
3
.
The retail price in equilibrium is r∗∗s = z as long as the investment in gener-
ation capacity is positive, meaning z ≤ 2−
√
5
3
.
Proof: See appendix B.
The social planner’s investment decreases in the capacity cost z, but is discon-
tinuous at z = 2−
√
5
3
because even optimal capacity levels and an optimal
retail price would result in a social welfare below the level achieved with-
out any electricity consumption and capacity investment. Given the socially
optimal capacity, the optimal retail price coincides with the capacity cost z.
4 Investments in Generating Capacity with
Two Competing Firms
Here we derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game described in
section 2 by backward induction. We start with the analysis of the wholesale
price for any retail price and capacity level of the two firms. Then we deter-
mine the retail price for any level of installed capacity when the two firms
anticipate the resulting equilibrium on the wholesale market. Finally the
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investment decisions of the two firms are analysed, given that the integrated
firms anticipate the consequences of their decision for the retail competition
and for the equilibrium on the wholesale market.
4.1 The Wholesale Market
If two firms compete, a wholesale market exists. Both firms committed in an
earlier stage to a retail price and they observe the demand shock ε. Therefore
total market demand is fixed and given by:
d(rA, rB, ε) = x (min{rA, rB}, ε)
where x(·) is defined in equation (2). The demand of firm j’s retail customers
depends on its retail price and on the retail price of its rival. It is given by:
dj(rj, rh, ε) =

x(rj, ε) if rj < rh,
1
2
x(rj, ε) if rj = rh,
0 if rj > rh,
with j, h ∈ {A,B}, j 6= h. (5)
In principle we can distinguish three different situations illustrated in figure 2.
First, total capacity might be smaller than the market demand (d(rj, rh, ε) >
kj+kh). Then the auctioneer would not find any auction price that balances
demand and supply and there would be a black-out; firms’ profits would
be 0. Note that the investments in generation capacity are sunk at this
stage. Second, if total capacity is sufficient to serve the market demand
15
6-
p
Electricity
pB
pA
kA kA + kB
S(p)
ε1 > ε2 > ε3
d(rj, rh, ε3)
d(rj, rh; ε2)
d(rj, rh; ε1)
Figure 2: The Wholesale Market
(d(rj, rh, ε) ≤ kj + kh), then the auction price is
p(pj, ph, ε) =
 pj if d(rj, rh, ε) > kh,ph if d(rj, rh, ε) ≤ kh,
 and pj ≥ ph. (6)
In the first case (see the first line of (6)) the capacity of the firm with the
lower bid is not sufficient to satisfy total demand if, for example, ε = ε2
in figure 2. Therefore the auctioneer sets the market price according to the
higher bid pj and dispatches the generating capacities of both firms. In the
second case (see the second line of (6)) is the low-bidding firm’s capacity
large enough to satisfy the market demand as for ε1 in figure 2. Only this
firm’s capacity is dispatched and the market price coincides with the lower
bid. How much of a firm’s capacity is dispatched depends on its bid and
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coincides with
yj(pj, ph, ε) =

min{kj, d(rj, rh, ε)} if pj < ph,
1
2
min{kj, d(rj, rh, ε)}
+1
2
max{d(rj, rh, ε)− kh, 0} if pj = ph,
max{d(rj, rh, ε)− kh, 0} if pj > ph,
(7)
given d(rj, rh, ε) ≤ kj + kh. Firm j’s profit in terms of its own bid price pj
and its rival’s bid price ph is
fj(pj, ph, rj, rh, ε) = rjdj(rj, rh, ε)) + p(pj, ph, ε)(yj(pj, ph, ε)− dj(rj, rh, ε)).
The firm collects all the revenues from its retail customers, has to pay the
wholesale market price for each unit of electricity which its retail customers
consume and earns the wholesale price on each unit of electricity it is allowed
to generate and to feed into the grid. The analysis of the firms’ best responses
in bid prices is presented in detail in appendix C and results in lemma 3.
Lemma 3 If both firms have installed enough generation capacity to satisfy
the demand of their retail customers (kj ≥ dj(rj, rh) for j = A,B) then
the bid prices and the auction price satisfy pA = pB = p(pA, pB, ε) = 0
and each firm’s profit net of capacity costs in equilibrium is fj(rj, rh, ε) =
rjdj(rj, rh, ε)) for j = A,B.
If the total capacities installed are sufficient to satisfy the market demand
(kA+kB ≥ d(rj, rh, ε)), but if one firm j, cannot satisfy the demand of its re-
tail customers (kj < dj(rj, rh)), then the bid prices satisfy ph = p¯(rj, rh, ε) =
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p(pj, ph, ε) and pj ≤ pˆ(rj, rh, ε) < p¯(rj, rh, ε) with
p¯(rj, rh, ε) =
rjdj(rj, rh, ε)
dj(rj, rh, ε)− kj and
pˆ(rj, rh, ε) =
rjdj(rj, rh, ε)
min{kh, d(rj, rh, ε)} − dh(rj, rh, ε) .
Profits are fj(rj, rh, ε) = 0 and fh(rj, rh, ε) = rjdj(rj, rh, ε) + rhdh(rj, rh, ε).
If total capacities fall short of the market demand (kA + kB ≥ d(rj, rh, ε)),
then no market clearing price exists and the system collapses. Both firms
realise zero profits.
Proof: See appendix C.
Given that both firms can serve the demand of their retail customers, each
firm prefers to undercut its rival during the auction. Thus, the Nash equi-
librium results in a zero auction price and each firm’s profit is limited to the
revenues earned from its retail customers. Now consider a situation where one
firm cannot serve the demand of its retail customers, and the other cannot
only serve its own customers, but can also make up for its rival’s deficit. The
deficit firm cannot avoid becoming a net payer during the auction. It can,
however, minimize its net demand position by undercutting. The firm with
the generation surplus is always a net supplier of electricity in this situation.
The unique Nash equilibrium is then characterised by the surplus firm always
bidding the maximum price. The deficit firm undercuts sufficiently, so that
the surplus firm has no incentive to undercut itself. The deficit firm cannot
realise a positive profit anymore, whereas the surplus firm can appropriate
all the potential rents in the market.
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4.2 The Retail Price Competition
In principle each firm can use three strategies in the retail price competition:
It can undercut is rival which results in all consumers signing a contract with
this firm (see equation (5)). It can offer the same retail price as its rival, thus
gaining half of the consumers and, thus, also half of the market demand, or it
can request a higher price which means no consumer subscribes to the firm.
Undercutting yields the following expected profit:
pij(rj, rh) =

∫ min{1,kj+rj−1}
max{0,rj−1} rjx(rj, ε)dε if max{1− kj, 0} ≤ rj < rh,
0 if 0 ≤ rj < min{1− kj, rh}.
(8)
Firm j can only realise positive profits if the demand shock is, on the one
hand small enough that it can serve the demand of its own costumers, and,
on the other hand, large enough that the market demand is positive.
If firm j sets the same retail price as its rival, then its expected profit depends
on the relative capacities of the two firms. If the considered firm j has a
smaller capacity than its rival, the structure of its expected profit is the
same as in the undercutting case, except that the firm realises only half of
the market demand:
pij
∣∣
rj=rh =

∫ min{1,2kj+rh−1}
max{0,rh−1}
rhx(rh,ε)
2
dε if rh ≥ max{1− 2kj, 0}
0 if 0 ≤ rh < 1− 2kj
(9)
for kj ≤ kh. If firm j has, however, a larger capacity than firm h, then
it correctly anticipates that it can appropriate all its rival’s rents in the
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wholesale market, if firm h is not able to serve its own consumers and if firm
j’s surplus of capacity above the demand of its retail customers makes up for
firm h’s deficit. For kj > kh the expected profit is
pij
∣∣
rj=rh =

∫ 1
max{0,rh−1}
rhx(rh,ε)
2
dε if rh ≥ 2− 2kh,∫ 2kh+rh−1
max{0,rh−1}
rhx(rh,ε)
2
dε+∫ min{kh+kj+rh−1,1}
2kh+rh−1 rhx(rh, ε)dε if max{1− 2kh, 0}
< rh < 2− 2kh,∫ min{kh+kj+rh−1,1}
0
rhx(rh, ε)dε if max{1− kj − kh, 0}
< rh < 1− 2kh,
0 if 0 ≤ rh < 1− kj − kh.
(10)
If firm j sets a higher retail price than its rival, no consumer subscribes to
firm j. It can, however, earn positive revenues when its rival cannot serve the
demand of its retail customers at its price rh and firm j’s capacity is large
enough to step in. Then firm j can again appropriate the whole rent via the
wholesale auction. Thus, the expected profit is:
p¯ij(rj, rh) =

0 if rj > rh ≥ 2− kh,∫ min{1,rh−1+kh+kj}
max{0,rh−1+kh} rhx(rh, ε)dε if max{1− kh − kj, 0}
≤ rh < min{rj, 2− kh},
0 if 0 ≤ rh < min{rj,
1− kh − kj}.
(11)
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From the analysis of the firms’ profit functions one can derive each firm’s best
response in retail prices. This is done in appendix D in detail. If the sum of
both firms generation capacities is rather large, both firms will always want
to undercut each other as in the usual Bertrand competition without any
capacity constraints and strategic considerations concerning the wholesale
market. The resulting Nash equilibrium is rh = rj = 0 and yields zero profits
for both firms.
If the aggregate generation capacity in the market is smaller, one can dis-
tinguish the symmetric case with kA = kB and the asymmetric case with
kA 6= kB. Let us first consider the asymmetric, but not too asymmetric case
with kj > kh and kh ≥ kj−12 . Then the best response of firm j with the
larger capacity would be characterised by undercutting as long as rh > rˆ.
It is characterised by rj > rh for max{0, 1 − 2kh} < rh ≤ rˆ, by rj ≥ rh
for max{0, 1 − kh − kj} ≤ rh ≤ max{0, 1 − 2kh}, and by indifference for
0 ≤ rh < 1 − kh − kj, because firm j’s profit is then zero no matter which
retail price it chooses. Firm h with the smaller capacity undercuts if rj > r
′
j,
and chooses the same price as the larger provider j if r′′j ≤ rj ≤ r′j. It sets
rh > rj if max{0, 1 − kj − kh} ≤ rj < r′′j and is indifferent because of zero
profits for rj = 0 or 0 ≤ rj < 1− kj − kh. The critical retail prices rˆ, r′j and
r′′j depend on the two firms’ capacity levels and are defined in appendix D.
One can show, however, that r′′j < rˆ < r
′
j always holds. The Nash equilib-
rium is again rh = rj = 0 for kh + kj ≥ 1 and rh < 1 − kh − kj as well as
rj < 1− kh − kj for kh + kj < 1. In both cases the firms realise zero profits.
Now consider the very asymmetric case with kh <
kj−1
2
. Firm j can still serve
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the whole market for any possible demand shock ε at prices where firm h
cannot even serve half of the market when they split the market at rh = rj.
Again firm h undercuts if rj > r
′
j, it sets rh = rj, if 1 − 2kh ≤ rj ≤ r′j,
and it is indifferent between undercutting, setting rh = rj and rh > rj, if
2 − kj ≤ rj < 1 − 2kh, because firm h would realise zero profits anyway.
For 0 < rj < 2 − kj firm h sets rh > rj and can earn positive profits again,
because firm j is no longer able to serve any demand possible. For rj = 0
firm h is indifferent between all rh ≥ 0, because profits are again zero. Firm
j’s best response does not change in principle. The Nash equilibrium with
rh = rj = 0 still exists, but there are other Nash equilibria where firm
h realises zero and firm j positive profits. In these equilibria firm j sets
rj ∈ [2− kj, 1− 2kh], where firm h realises zero profits no matter which price
it sets, and firm h undercuts or sets rh > rj if rj = max{3/4, 2 − kj}. The
results for asymmetric generation capacities of the two firms are summarised
in the following lemma:
Lemma 4 If the two firms differ in their generation capacity (kA 6= kB),
then there are no Nash equilibria in retail prices where both firms realise
positive profits. The Nash equilibrium in retail prices with r∗A = r
∗
B = 0
always exists. For kA + kB < 1 there are also multiple Nash equilibria with
r∗A < 1 − kA − kB and r∗B < 1 − kA − kB. All these equilibria result in zero
profits for both firms.
For kh < (kj − 1)/2 with j, h = A,B and j 6= h there are, in addition,
multiple Nash equilibria with max{r∗h, 2 − kj} ≤ r∗j ≤ max{1 − 2kh, 3/4}. If
kh < min {1/8, (kj − 1)/2} holds, then there is an additional equilibrium with
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either r∗j = 3/4 < r
∗
h for kj > 5/4 or r
∗
j = 2− kj ≤ r∗h for 1 < kj ≤ 5/4. The
low capacity firm h realises zero profits in all these additional Nash equilibria
and firm j with the larger capacity:
pij(r
∗
j , r
∗
h) = min{r∗j , r∗h}
(
3
2
−min{r∗j , r∗h}
)
> 0.
For kA 6= kB there are no other Nash equilibria in retail prices.
Proof: See appendix D .
If the two firms are symmetric in their generation capacities (kA = kB) and
the capacities are not too large, both firms undercut, as long as the rivals
price exceeds rˆ. When the rival sets its price at rˆ, each firm is indifferent
between setting a higher price and the same price as the rival. If the rival’s
price is below rˆ, but not smaller than 1− kA − kB, then both firms want to
set a higher price than their rival. If the rival sets a retail price of zero or
a price below 1 − kA − kB, then the considered firm is indifferent between
undercutting, setting a higher or the same price, because all three options
result in zero profits. Thus, the same Nash equilibrium or equilibria exist(s)
as in the asymmetric case with zero equilibrium profits. In addition there
is a Nash equilibrium with rA = rB = rˆ > max{0, 1 − kA − kB}, where
both firms realise positive profits in equilibrium. Our results concerning
the competition in retail prices with symmetric generation capacities are
summarised in lemma 5.
Lemma 5 If the two firms have the same generation capacity kA = kB = k
then there is always a Nash equilibrium in retail prices with rA = rB = 0.
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For k < 1/2 there are also multiple Nash equilibria with rA < 1 − 2k and
rB < 1 − 2k. All these equilibria result in zero profits for both firms. For
k <
√
5/2, there is an additional Nash equilibrium with
r∗A = r
∗
B =

2−√2k if 0 ≤ k < 1√
2
,
1
2
(
3−√4k2 − 1) if 1√
2
≤ k <
√
5
2
,
where the expected equilibrium profits are
piA (r
∗
A, r
∗
B) = piB (r
∗
A, r
∗
B) =

k2
(
1− k√
2
)
if 0 ≤ k < 1√
2
,
1
8
(1− 4k2+
3
√
4k2 − 1) if 1√
2
≤ k <
√
5
2
.
Proof: See appendix D .
In the following section we assume that the two firms select for given capaci-
ties the equilibrium that Pareto dominates all the other possible equilibria in
retail prices. Which equilibrium is Pareto dominant for which combination of
capacities is illustrated in figure 3. If both firms choose symmetric capacities
with kA = kB = k <
√
5/2 (see the straight line in figure 3 which cuts into
A and B), the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium results in the retail prices
r∗A = r
∗
B > 0 given in Lemma 5. With modestly asymmetric capacities (area
A in figure 3) the unique Nash equilibrium in retail prices is rh = rj = 0.
With asymmetric capacities and kh < max{(kj − 1)/2, 1/8} (area C in figure
3) or kj < max{(kh − 1)/2, 1/8} (area C ′ in figure 3) the Pareto dominant
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6-
kh
kj
1
1
2
2
√
5
2
√
5
2
1√
2
1√
2
A
A
B
B
C
C ′
D
D′
A: r∗h = r∗j = 0
B: r∗h, r∗j ∈ [0, 1− kh − kj)
C: r∗j = max{2− kj, 34} < r∗h
D: r∗j = 1− 2kh = r∗h
Figure 3: Pareto Dominant Nash Equilibria in Retail Prices
Nash equilibrium is characterised by r∗j = max{3/4, 2− kj} < r∗h in the first
case and by r∗h = max{3/4, 2 − kh} < r∗j in the second. It implies that the
firm with the large capacity chooses the monopoly retail price without be-
ing undercut by the low capacity firm. If the two firms’ capacities satisfy
1/8 ≤ kh < (kj − 1)/2 or 1/8 ≤ kj < (kh − 1)/2 (area D and D′ in figure
3), then the firms set identical retail prices r∗h = r
∗
j = 1 − 2kh in the Pareto
dominant Nash equilibrium, but the low capacity firm can never serve its
customers and therefore realizes zero profits. For capacities which satisfy
kj + kh < 1 (area B) all the equilibria imply always a black-out. They are
pay-off equivalent because both firms realise zero profits.
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4.3 The Firms’ Investments in Generation Capacity
The firms anticipate the resulting retail prices and the prices on the wholesale
market when they decide on their generation capacities. For a very low
capacity of its rival, a firm can either choose a very large capacity and ensure
itself monopoly revenues, or at least restricted monopoly revenues, or it can
choose the same generation capacity as its rival in order to generate positive
revenues. If the firm chooses a smaller or only a modestly larger capacity
than its rival, it cannot earn positive profits. Firm j’s profit is:
Πj(kj, kh) =

−zkj if kj < kh,
k2j
(
1− kj√
2
)
− zkj if kj = kh,
−zkj if kh < kj ≤ 2kh + 1,
(2− kj)
(
kj − 12
)− zkj if 2kh + 1 < kj ≤ 54 ,
9
16
− zkj if kj > 54 ,
(12)
for 0 ≤ kh < 18 . If the rival’s capacity is larger, but still small, the firm can no
longer earn monopoly revenues, but for some small levels of kh, still positive
revenues, if it invests in a very much larger capacity than its rival. Its profit
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is:
Πj(kj, kh) =

−zkj if kj < kh,
k2j
(
1− kj√
2
)
− zkj if kj = kh,
−zkj if kh < kj ≤
2kh + 1,
max
{
(1− 2kh)
(
1
2
+ 2kh
)
, 0
}− zkj if 2kh + 1 < kj,
(13)
for 1
8
≤ kh < 1√2 . If the rival chooses intermediate levels of capacities,
firm j’s revenues from investing in the same level of capacity changes and
monopolization is no option any more. Firm j’s profit is:
Πj(kj, kh) =

−zkj if kj < kh,
1
8
(
1− 4k2j + 3
√
4k2j − 1
)
− zkj if kj = kh,
−zkj if kh < kj,
(14)
for 1√
2
≤ kh <
√
5
2
. If the firm’s rival chooses very large capacities, then firm
j can no longer earn positive revenues independent of its own capacity level.
Firm j’s profit is:
Πj(kj, kh) = −zkj (15)
for kh >
√
5
2
. From these profit functions one can derive each firm’s best
response function in generation capacity and the resulting subgame perfect
Nash equilibria. This is done in detail in appendix E. Since both firms are
symmetric, the best response functions for the two firms are also symmetric
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and depend on the level of the capacity costs z. For very low levels of the
rivals capacity kh firm j can always monopolize the market by choosing the
same capacity as the monopolist. This is always the best response as long as
the capacity cost is low enough to ensure a positive monopoly profit. If the
rival’s capacity increases, then firm j can still monopolize the market, but
must increase its own capacity beyond the optimal monopoly level. Thus,
firm j’s profit from monopolization decreases when the rival’ capacity in-
creases. At a certain threshold of the rival’s capacity kh it is optimal for
firm j to drastically reduce its capacity and to switch either to a symmetric
capacity choice, where both firms share the market, or to zero capacity when
monopolization as well as sharing yields negative profits, depending on the
level of the capacity costs z. For very large capacities of the rival it is always
optimal for firm j to install no capacity. The best responses of the two firms
and the resulting equilibria are illustrated in figure 4 for different levels of
capacity costs .
With low capacity costs there are multiple subgame perfect Nash equilibria
in which the firms choose identical capacities and share the market. For
intermediate levels of capacity costs there are still multiple Nash equilibria
where the firms choose identical capacities. In addition there are, however,
two equilibria where one of the two firms chooses the monopoly capacity
and the other does not invest. For high levels of capacity costs the sharing
equilibria vanish. Only the two subgame perfect Nash equilibria, where one
firm monopolizes the market, do still exist. They disappear when the capacity
costs are so high that even a monopolist can not generate positive profits in
expectation. Our results concerning the investments of the two competing
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firms in generation capacities are summarised in proposition 3, where we use
k ≡ 1√
2
(
1−
√
1− 2z
√
2
)
, (16)
which defines the smallest capacity that ensures zero profit, when both firms
choose the same capacity,
k¯ ≡
{
k ∈
[
1√
2
,
√
5
2
] ∣∣∣∣1− 4k2 + 3√4k2 − 18 − zk = 0
}
, (17)
which defines the largest capacity that ensures zero profit, when both firms
choose the same capacity, and
k˜ ≡
{
k ∈
[
0,
1
2
] ∣∣∣∣k2(1− k√2
)
− zk = (18)
(1− 2k)
(
1
2
+ 2k
)
− z(2k + 1)
}
,
which defines the capacity where the necessary capacity to monopolize is as
profitable as choosing an identical capacity as one’s rival.
Proposition 3 In the subgame perfect Nash equilibria the two competing
firms choose identical generation capacities with
k∗A = k
∗
B = k
∗
d ∈ [k˜, k¯], if the capacity costs satisfy 0 ≤ z < 0.2118.
They choose either identical generation capacities with
k∗A = k
∗
B = k
∗
d ∈ [min{k˜, k}, k¯] or assymmetric capacities with
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k∗j = k
∗
m and k
∗
h = 0, j, h = A,B, j 6= h, if 0.2118 ≤ z <
1
2
√
2
,
where k∗m is the monopoly capacity defined in proposition 1.
The firms choose only asymmetric capacities with
k∗j = k
∗
m and k
∗
h = 0, j, h = A,B, j 6= h if
1
2
√
2
≤ z < 1
2
.
For z ≥ 1
2
both firms do not invest in generation capacity in equilibrium.
The retail price in the equilibria with identical positive capacities is
r∗d =

2−√2k∗d if min{k˜, k} ≤ k∗d < 1√2 ,
1
2
(
3−√4(k∗d)2 − 1) if 1√2 ≤ k∗d < k¯.
Whereas the retail price coincides with the monopoly price r∗m, given in propo-
sition 1, if the firms choose asymmetric capacities in equilibrium such that
one firm monopolizes the market.
Proof: See Appendix E.
Note that regardless of whether the firms play a duopoly equilibrium with
kA = kB ∈ [min{k˜, k}, k¯] or a monopoly equilibrium, no black-outs occur
independent of the demand shock ε.
In the following we focus mainly on subgame perfect equilibria, which are
not Pareto dominated by other equilibria. By comparing each firm’s profits
in the different equilibria described in proposition 3 one can conclude:
Corollary 1 If the capacity cost satisfies 0 ≤ z < 0.2118, then there is a
unique Pareto dominant subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where both firms
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choose kˆ, which is defined in (19). For 0.2118 ≤ z < 1
2
√
2
the subgame
perfect equilibria that are not Pareto dominated are either characterised by
both firms choosing kˆ or by one firm choosing k∗m and the other installing
zero capacities. If 1
2
√
2
≤ z < 1
2
holds, then there are two equilibria, which
are not Pareto dominated, with one firm choosing k∗m and the other installing
zero capacities. For z ≥ 1
2
there exists only one equilibrium where both firms
do not invest in capacities.
The capacity kˆ is the capacity that maximises each firm’s profit, if both firms
choose the same level of capacity:
kˆ = argmaxk∈[ 1√
2
,k¯]
{
1− 4k2 + 3√4k2 − 1
8
− zk
}
. (19)
For intermediate levels of capacity costs the equilibrium with kA = kB = kˆ
Pareto dominates all the other equilibria with kA = kB ∈ [min{k˜, k}, k¯], but
not the two monopoly equilibria with kA = k
∗
m and kB = 0 and kB = k
∗
m and
kA = 0. There the monopolist realises always a higher profit than each single
firm in the duopoly equilibrium whereas the firm without any generation
capacity has zero profits instead of positive profits in the duopoly equilibrium
with kA = kB = kˆ. Thus, even if we consider only Pareto dominant subgame
perfect Nash equilibria, uniqueness cannot be achieved.
5 Comparison of the Two Market Structures
In Figure 5 the total capacities in the monopoly and duopoly cases as well as
the socially optimal capacity are outlined. The limits of the total capacities
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in the competitive equilibria, as well as the total capacity in the Pareto
dominant competitive equilibrium and the total capacity in the monopolistic
equilibrium in the duopoly case are painted in blue. The capacity installed
in the monopoly case is characterised by a red line and the socially optimal
capacity is drawn in green. It is obvious that together the duopolists might
invest more or less than the monopolist or the social planner. If we assume,
however, that the two firms select a subgame perfect equilibrium that is not
Pareto dominated then we arrive at proposition 4.
Proposition 4 If the two firms in the duopoly case always select a subgame
perfect equilibrium, which is not Pareto dominated by an other one, then the
total capacity in the duopoly case exceeds the installed capacity of a monopolist
for capacity costs that satisfy 0 ≤ z < 0.2118. It is the same or larger for
0.2118 ≤ z < 1
2
√
2
, and it is the same for z ≥ 1
2
√
2
. If it is positive, it is still
inefficiently low from a social welfare perspective.
Proof: The statement follows from k∗∗s > 2kˆ > k
∗
m for all 0 ≤ z < 12√2 and
from k∗∗s > k
∗
m for all
1
2
√
2
≤ z < 2− > sqrt5
3
.
Proposition 4 seems to confirm common wisdom that oligopolistic firms want
to produce more than a monopolist and would, therefore, also install more
capacity. If we compare, however, the prices in equilibrium for those subgame
perfect Nash equilibria that are not Pareto dominated, we derive proposition
5.
Proposition 5 If the two firms in the duopoly case select a subgame perfect
equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated by an other equilibrium, then the
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retail price in the duopoly case exceeds the retail price of the monopolist for
capacity costs that satisfy 0 ≤ z < 0.2118. The retail price is the same or
higher for 0.2118 ≤ z < 1
2
√
2
, and it is the same for z ≥ 1
2
√
2
. Monopoly
and duopoly retail prices exceed the retail price in the social optimum for all
capacity costs z.
Proof: The statement follows from substituting kˆ into r∗d from proposition
3 and comparing it with r∗m from proposition 1 and r
∗∗
s from propositon 2.
Proposition 5 contradicts the common view that oligopolistic firms want to
produce more and would therefore install larger capacities. Since the two
firms would set a higher retail price than a monopolist, consumers would
always consume less under the duopoly than in the monopolistic case. Thus,
the higher level of installed capacities in the competitive equilibrium are
mainly a consequence of strategic considerations. Larger capacities and a
higher retail price ensure that a firm has a higher chance to serve the demand
of its own retail customers. With a small capacity and low retail prices a firm
risks losing all its profits in those cases where it can not meet the demand of
its retail customers.
As long as capacities are positive in the market equilibrium consumers can
always realise their consumption because black-outs do neither occur in the
duopoly nor in the monopoly case for any possible demand shock. Thus,
social welfare for both cases is given by:
W =
∫ 1
0
U (x(r, ε), ε) dε− zk, (20)
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where U (x(r, ε), ε) is defined in equation (1). The higher prices that result
in lower consumption levels, and the larger capacities, which only increase
the capacity costs without creating any extra gain from a more secure supply
in the duopoly case, do explain proposition 6.
Proposition 6 If the two firms in the duopoly case select always a subgame
perfect equilibrium that is not Pareto dominated by any other equilibrium,
then the social welfare in the duopoly case is smaller than in the case with a
monopolist for capacity costs that satisfy 0 ≤ z < 0.2118. Social welfare is
the same or smaller for 0.2118 ≤ z < 1
2
√
2
, and it is the same for z ≥ 1
2
√
2
.
The achieved social welfare in the monopoly case is for all 0 ≤ z < 2−√5/3
sub-optimal.
Proof: The statement follows from substituting the relevant consumption
levels x(r, ε) into the social welfare function (20) and from comparing the
social welfare achieved in a monopoly with the one in the duopoly and in the
socially optimal equilibrium.
If we take into account all possible subgame pefect equilibria in the duopoly
case, retail prices can also be lower than in the monopoly case. It turns
out, however, that social welfare is nearly always lower in the duopoly case
than in the monopoly. The reason is that in those equilibria where the retail
prices are lower, the duopoly capacities are so much higher that capacity
costs outweigh the gains of the consumers from higher consumption levels.
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6 Conclusions
Given the multiplicity of subgame perfect Nash equilibria in the duopoly
case, it is not easy to derive clear cut conclusions from the analysis here. If
we focus on subgame perfect Nash equilibria which are not Pareto dominated
by other equilibria, then it is not a problem that competitive firms do not
invest enough in generating capacity. Their investments together usually
exceed the capacity installed by a monopolist. Their retail price is, however,
too high which leads to a lower social welfare than realised in the monopoly
case.
Thus, in the case analysed here where consumers cannot respond directly to
electricity prices, but are guaranteed a certain retail price before an uncertain
demand is realised, competition is bad for social welfare. This contrasts
with the results in a companion paper (Boom, 2002), where consumers can
directly respond to electricity price changes and can therefore take part in
the electricity auction, and in a follow-up paper (Boom and Buehler, 2007),
where generating firms are vertically separated from the retail firms. In both
settings competition is always beneficial for social welfare.
What drives our results here is the retail price competition where prices
turn out to be relatively high for the installed capacities. A large installed
capacity, as well as a high retail price makes it less probable that a firm is
not able to satisfy the demand of its retail customers, thus, losing all its rents
during the auction.
Our analysis supports the suspicion of the European Union against electricity
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generating firms that are vertically integrated.19 In order to judge, however,
whether the European Union’s suspicion is indeed justified because of the
strategic effect identified in our model, it is necessary to check the robustness
of this effect under different sets of assumptions. It would be interesting, for
example, to consider the same type of model if in case of an unsatisfied own
retail demand the loss would be less drastic. This can be expected if there
would be either more competitors or if there would be a lower regulated
price cap in the auction which would punish the competitor, who is not able
to meet his contracted demand, less. The analysis of a model with more
competitors and a lower price cap are left to further research.
Appendix
A The Monopolist’s Price and Capacity Choice
After integration the monopolist’s profit function is
pim(r, k) =

r
2
(2− r)2 − zk if r > 1,
r
(
3
2
− r)− zk if 2− k ≤ r ≤ 1,
r
2
(2r − r2 + k2 − 1)− zk if 0 ≤ r < 2− k,
19The European Union ruled in its Directive 2003/54/EC concerning common rules for
the internal market in electricity adopted on 26 June 2003 that electricity generating firms
which are also integrated into the transmission and distribution of electricity have to be
functionally disintegrated.
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for k ≥ 1 and
pim(r, k) =

r
2
(2− r)2 − zk if r ≥ 2− k,
r k
2
2
− zk 1 ≤ r < 2− k,
r
2
(2r − r2 + k2 − 1)− zk if 1− k ≤ r < 1,
−zk if 0 ≤ r < 1− k,
for 0 ≤ k < 1. Differentiating pim(r, k) with respect to r yields that pim(r, k)
has a maximum at r∗(k) = 3
4
, as long as k ≥ 5
4
, and at r∗(k) = 2 − k for
0 ≤ k < 5
4
. Substituting these retail prices into pim(r, k) yields:
Πm(k) =

9
16
− zk if k ≥ 5
4
,
5k
2
− k2 − 1− zk if 1 ≤ k < 5
4
,
1
2
k2(2− k)− zk if 0 ≤ k < 1.
Differentiating Πm(k) with respect to k yields that Πm(k) has a maximum at
k∗(z) = 5
4
− z
2
for 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
2
and at k∗(z) = 1
6
(
4 +
√
16− 24z) for z > 1
2
. The
maximised profit, Πm(k
∗(z)), is continuous and monotonously decreasing in
z. It becomes negative at z = 1
2
.
B The Social Planner’s Price and Capacity
Choice
After substituting U(x, ε) from (1) and x(r, ε) from (2) in the social welfare
function (4) and integrating it, we obtain
W (r, k) =

2−(3−r)r2
3
− zk if r ≥ 2− k,
k3+3rk2−4
6
− zk if 2− k > r ≥ 1,
k3+3rk2+(3−2r)r2−5
6
− zk if 1 > r ≥ 1− k
−2
3
− zk if 1− k > r ≥ 0,
(21)
for 0 ≤ k < 1 and
W (r, k) =

2−(3−r)r2
3
− zk if r ≥ 1,
1−r2
2
− zk if 1 > r ≥ 2− k,
k3+3rk2+(3−2r)r2−5
6
− zk if 2− k > r ≥ 0,
(22)
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for k ≥ 1. Maximizing the social welfare with respect to the retail price
results in the socially optimal retail price
r∗∗(k) = max{2− k, 0}.
Substituting the retail price in (21) and (22) yields
W(k) =

1
2
− zk if k > 2,
1−(2−k)2
2
− zk if 1 ≤ k < 2,
2−(1+k)(2−k)2
3
− zk if 0 ≤ k < 1,
(23)
as the social welfare in terms of the capacity, given socially optimal retail
prices. Differentiating W(k) with respect to k shows that W(k) has a maxi-
mum at k∗∗s = 2− z. The maximized welfare function W(2− z) is U -shaped
in z and results in W(2 − z) < W(0) = −2/3 for 2 −√5/3 < z < 2. For
z ≥ 2 the social planner can never do better than choosing k = 0.
C The Nash Equilibrium in Price Bids on the
Wholesale Market.
Here it is assumed that total capacities are sufficient to satisfy the market
demand (kA + kB ≥ d(rA, rB, ε)). Then, taking into account (7) each firm’s
profit function is given by:
fj(pj, ph, rj, rh, ε) =

rjdj(rj, rh, ε) + p(pj, ph, ε)
· (min{kj, d(rj, rh, ε)} − dj(rj, rh, ε)) if pj < ph,
rjdj(rj, rh, ε) +
p(pj ,ph,ε)
2
· (min{kj, d(rj, rh, ε)} − dj(rj, rh, ε))
+
p(pj ,ph,ε)
2
(max{d(rj, rh, ε)− kh, 0}
−dj(rj, rh, ε)) if pj = ph,
rjdj(rj, rh, ε) + p(pj, ph, ε)
· (max{d(rj, rh, ε)− kh, 0} − dj(rj, rh, ε)) if pj > ph.
If both firms are able to serve the demand of their retail customers, meaning
kj ≥ dj(rj, rh, ε) with j = A,B, then both firms want to undercut their rival
because by doing so they avoid being a net payer in the auction, but become
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a net receiver of payments. Therefore pj = ph = 0 = p(pj, ph, ε) is the unique
Nash equilibrium. Substituting this into fj(pj, ph, rj, rh, ε) yields fj(rj, rh, ε)
from lemma 3 for kj ≥ dj(rj, rh, ε) with j = A,B.
Suppose now that only firm h can meet the demand of its retail customers
(kh ≥ dh(rj, rh)), whereas firm j cannot (kj < dj(rj, rh)). Then firm j
is always a net payer and firm h a net receiver in the auction. Firm j
minimizes its payments by always undercutting firm h. If firm h sets ph >
pj, the auction price would be p(pj, ph, ε) = ph and its optimal price bid
would be ph = p¯(rj, rh, ε), given in lemma 3, which ensures zero profits for
firm j and the profit fh(rj, rh, ε) = rjdj(rj, rh, ε) + rhdh(rj, rh, ε) for firm h.
The optimal price bid from below would either be indeterminate, if both
capacities were needed to satisfy market demand (kh < d(rj, rh, ε)), or it
would be ph = pj − µ with µ → 0 if kh ≥ d(rj, rh, ε). The auction price
would in both cases satisfy p(pj, ph, ε) = pj and firm h’s profit would be
fh(pj, ph, rj, rh, ε) = rhdh(rj, rh, ε) + pj (min{kh, d(rj, rh, ε)} − dh(rj, rh, ε)).
Firm h prefers undercutting firm j’s price as long as pj > pˆ(rj, rh, ε) holds,
and ph = p¯(rj, rh, ε) otherwise. Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria with
pj ≤ pˆ(rj, rh, ε) and ph = p¯(rj, rh, ε), and a unique auction price p(pj, ph, ε) =
p¯(rj, rh, ε). Substituting the auction price into the two firms’ profit functions
yields fj(rj, rh, ε) and fh(rj, rh, ε) from lemma 3 for kj < dj(rj, rh).
D The Nash Equilibrium in Retail Prices.
If firm j undercuts its rival’s retail price, its best response is then
rj(rh) =

max
{
2− kj, 34
}
if rh > max
{
2− kj, 34
}
rh − µ if 0 ≤ rh ≤ max
{
2− kj, 34
} (24)
with µ→ 0 being the smallest unit in which retail prices can be announced.
If firm j sets rj > rh, then it is indifferent between all prices that satisfy
this restriction, because its profit, given in (11), does not depend on the level
of rj. Therefore the overall best response is determined by the comparison
of pij(rj(rh), rh), derived from (8) and (24), with pij(rj, rh)
∣∣
rj=rh from (9) or
(10), respectively, and with p¯ij(rj, rh) defined in (11).
Suppose that kj > kh. Then the overall best response of firm j for kj > kh ≥√
5− k2j is given by rj(rh) = rj(rh) from (24). For min
{
kj,
√
5− k2j
}
>
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kh ≥ 0 the overall best response is
rj(rh)

= max
{
2− kj, 34
}
if rh > max
{
2− kj, 34
}
,
= rh − µ if rˆ < rh ≤ max
{
2− kj, 34
}
,
> rh if max{0, 1− 2kh} < rh ≤ min {rˆ,
max
{
2− kj, 34
}}
,
≥ rh if max{0, 1− kj − kh} < rh ≤
min
{
1− 2kh,max
{
2− kj, 34
}}
,
≥ 0 if 0 ≤ rh ≤ max{0, 1− kj − kh}.
(25)
with
rˆ =

3−
√
2(k2h+k
2
j )−1
2
if kj ≥ kh > min{
√
1− k2j , kj − 1},
1− kh if 0 ≤ kh ≤ kj − 1,
2−
√
k2h + k
2
j if 0 ≤ kh ≤ min{
√
1− k2j , kj}.
(26)
Firm h’s best response in retail prices is rh(rj) = rj(rh) for kj > kh ≥
√
5
2
.
For min{kj,
√
5
2
} > kh ≥ max
{
0,
kj−1
2
}
firm h’s best response in retail prices
is given by
rh(rj)

= max
{
2− kh, 34
}
if rj > max
{
2− kh, 34
}
,
= rj − µ if max
{
2− kh, 34
} ≥ rj > r′j,
= rj if r
′
j ≥ rj > r′′j ,
> rj if r
′′
j ≥ rj > max{0, 1− kj − kh},
≥ 0 if max{0, 1− kj − kh} ≥ rj ≥ 0,
(27)
where the critical price r′j for the rival with the larger capacity is defined as:
r′j = max
{
3−√4k2h − 1
2
, 2−
√
2kh
}
, (28)
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and the critical price r′′j as:
r′′j = max
3−
√
4k2j − 1
2
,
5−
√
12k2h + 6k
2
j − 2
3
, 0
 (29)
for kj > 1 and
r′′j =

max
{
3−
√
4k2j−1
2
,
5−
√
12k2h+6k
2
j−2
3
}
if kj ≥ kh ≥
√
1−k2j
2
,
2−
√
2k2h + k
2
j if
√
1−k2j
2
> kh ≥ 0
(30)
for 1√
2
< kj ≤ 1 and
r′′j = max
{
2−
√
2kj, 2−
√
2k2h + k
2
j
}
(31)
for 0 ≤ kj < 1√2 . It can be shown that r′j > rˆ > r′′j holds for kj > kh ≥
kj−1
2
. Thus, rh = rj = 0 is the only Nash equilibrium in retail prices for
kj > max{1−kh, kh} and kh ≥ kj−12 . There are multiple Nash equilibria with
rj < 1− kj − kh and rh < 1− kj − kh for 1− kh ≥ kj > kh ≥ kj−12 .
For
kj−1
2
> kh > 0 firm h’s best response in retail prices is
rh(rj)

= 2− kh if rj > 2− kh,
= rj − µ if 2− kh ≥ rj > r′j,
= rj if r
′
j ≥ rj ≥ 1− 2kh,
≥ 0 if 1− 2kh > rj ≥ 2− kj,
> rj if 2− kj > rj > 0,
≥ 0 if rj = 0,
(32)
where r′j is defined in (28). Thus, rj ∈ [2−kj,min{1−2kh, 3/4}] and rh ≤ rj
is always an equilibrium. For kh < max
{
kj−1
2
, 1
8
}
an additional equilibrium
exists with rj = max{2− kj, 3/4} < rh.
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Now suppose that kA = kB = k, then each firm has the same best response
in retail prices. If k >
√
5
2
, then both firms’ best response is given by rj(rh)
from equation (24) and the only possible Nash equilibrium is rA = rB = 0.
If 0 ≤ k <
√
5
2
, then each firm’s best response in retail prices is given by:
rj(rh) =

= max
{
2− k, 3
4
}
if rh > max
{
2− k, 3
4
}
,
= rh − µ if max
{
2− k, 3
4
} ≥ rh > rˆ
≥ rh if rh = rˆ
> rh if rˆ > rh > max{0, 1− 2k},
≥ rh if max{0, 1− 2k} ≥ rh ≥ 0,
(33)
with rˆ from (26) with kj = kh = k. Then again there is always a Nash
equilibrium with rA = rB = 0. If k < 1/2, then there are also multiple Nash
equilibria with rA < 1 − 2k and rB < 1 − 2k, which result as well in zero
profits for both firms. In addition there is always a Nash equilibrium with
rA = rB = rˆ and positive profits for both firms.
E The Nash Equilibrium in Generation Ca-
pacities
From the maximization of Πj(kj, kh) given in (12), (13), (14) and (15) with
respect to kj one can derive the best response of firm j in its generation
capacity kj. It is given by:
kj(kh) =

5
4
− z
2
if 0 ≤ kh < 18 − z4 ,
1 + 2kh if
1
8
− z
4
≤ kh < k˜,
kh if k˜ ≤ kh < k¯,
0 if kh ≥ k¯,
(34)
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for 0 ≤ z < 0.2484, where k˜ is defined in (18) and k¯ in (17), by:
kj(kh) =

5
4
− z
2
if 0 ≤ kh < 18 − z4 ,
1 + 2kh if
1
8
− z
4
≤ kh < 1−2z+
√
9+4z(z−5)
8
,
0 if
1−2z+
√
9+4z(z−5)
8
≤ kh < k,
kh if k ≤ kh < k¯,
0 if kh ≥ k¯,
(35)
for 0.2484 ≤ z < 1
2
√
2
, where k is defined in (16), by
kj(kh) =

5
4
− z
2
if 0 ≤ kh < 18 − z4 ,
1 + 2kh if
1
8
− z
4
≤ kh < 1−2z+
√
9+4z(z−5)
8
,
0 if kh ≥ 1−2z+
√
9+4z(z−5)
8
,
(36)
for 1
2
√
2
≤ z < 1
2
and by
kj(kh) = 0 (37)
for z ≥ 1
2
. Checking for kj (kh(kj)) = kj and kh (kj(kh)) = kh yields the
subgame perfect Nash equilibria described in Proposition 3.
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Figure 4: Nash Equilibria in Capacities
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Figure 5: Total Capacities with a Duopoly, with a Monopoly and in the
Social Optimum
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